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ESSAY
ON RELIGIOUS LEGAL
ETHICS
THOMAS L. SHAFFER*
Perhaps as a result of the new and populous generation of lawyers,
or as a holdover from the anti-war generation of law students, or maybe
even as fall-out from Watergate, legal ethics has become a serious
discipline.'
Legal ethics has become a new and impressive mansion-a mansion
with many rooms. It contains a rather opulent ground-floor room for the
American Bar Association project on professionalism, along with a
smaller, second-floor room for state bar association projects of a similar
sort, with a stately balcony for projects on civility.2 There is a dusty but
capacious library for the academics who are making legal ethics their
principal interest. Most of these academics are young, and in one way or
another are influenced by Immanuel Kant and the elsewhere discredited
influence of the Enlightenment on the broad American academic disci-
pline of ethics.3 There are spare, rather Calvinistic rooms at the rear of
the mansion for the practicing attorneys who operate the disciplinary
* The author is the Robert and Marion Short Professor of Law at the University of Notre
Dame. He received his B.A. from the University of Albuquerque, his J.D. from the Univer-
sity of Notre Dame, and an honorary LL.D. from St. Mary's University of Texas. He is a
member of the Indiana Bar.
1 See THOMAS L. SHAFFER & MARY SHAFFER, AMERICAN LAWYERS AND THEIR COMMUNITIES
ch. 1 (1991) (discussing teaching of ethics in American law schools).
2 See Thomas L. Shaffer, Lawyer Professionalism as a Moral Argument, 26 GONZ. L. REV.
393, 393-413 (1990-1991).
3 See generally, JOHN McGowAN, POSTMODERNISM AND ITS CRITICS (1991). Scholars in both
jurisprudence and philosophy outside the law use the term "postmodern" to describe what
happened to Kant and the Enlightenment. Id. at 31. I take the word to mean that it is not
Christians and Jews who did the discrediting, although we tried. In fact, many of us are
happy to take advantage of a world that has somehow embraced a state beyond merely
'modern."
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process maintained by state courts of last resort. These rooms all have
one-way doors leading to an alley.
The room I use is in the attic. It is small and easy to ignore. It looks
like a closet that has been converted into a shrine, with enough space for
an altar with one candle and a bouquet of flowers. It is the room devoted
to religious legal ethics. Those who use it tend to do so one at a time.
Religious legal ethics maintains a room of its own through the influ-
ence of two powerful patrons-the first being the lawyers in the man-
sion's other rooms who consult the religious tradition, or who occasion-
ally want to put forth the appearance that they consult it. The second
source of patronage is a much older and even larger mansion down the
street, filled with people who work in academic disciplines labeled "reli-
gious," including religious ethics.4
Each of these two sources of patronage for religious legal ethics is
vast and fairly potent. Consider, first, lawyers and professors whose
work embraces legal ethics and who want to have a small, unobtrusive
part of their new edifice consecrated to religion. Most of these individu-
als believe that it is important to have the religious tradition taken into
account. Although they may not allow religion to influence their actions,
most of them claim belief in God,5 even belief in miracles,' even belief in
Judgment Day 7 -the Eschaton: Death, Judgment, Heaven, Hell! Most
of them go to religious services.' Eight out of ten report that they have
experienced the presence of God in their lives.9 Most claim membership
in a religious association.' Many sing in choirs.
But these lawyer-patrons do not seem to find religion either politi-
cally or intellectually interesting. They summon those of us who "do"
religious ethics from our attic room, and sometimes from the mansion
down the street, as if they were townspeople in movies about the Old
4 I am going to avoid the taint of denominational Catholicism and avoid the Catholic label
for this discipline-"moral theology." See, e.g., MORAL THEOLOGY: CHALLENGES FOR THE
FUTURE: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF RICHARD A. MCCORMICK (Charles E. Curran ed., 1990). I am
also going to avoid the corresponding taint from the Protestant tradition by not calling it
"theological ethics." See, e.g., HELMUT THELICK, THEOLOGICAL ETHICS (William H. Lazareth
ed., 1979). Jews call it "law." See, e.g., MICHAEL WYSCHOGROD, THE BODY OF FAITH: JUDA-
ISM AS CORPOREAL ELECTION 198 (1983) (referring to the "ethical law"). I confine my claim
of knowledge on the subject to the religious ethics of Jews and Christians.
5 GEORGE GALLUP, JR. & JIM CASTELLI, THE PEOPLE'S RELIGION (1989). "Nine out of ten
Americans say they have never doubted the existence of God .... " Id. at 56.
6 Id. at 58. "Eighty-two percent of those surveyed agreed that 'even today, miracles are
performed by the power of God.'" Id.
7 Id. at 56. Eight in ten of those surveyed believe they will face God at Judgment Day. Id.
8 Id. at 31. A 1986 survey found that 42% of Americans had attended church within the
past week, while 49% had attended on Easter Sunday. Id.
9 Id. at 58.
10 GALLUP & CASTELLI, supra note 5, at 29. Sixty-five percent of those surveyed said they
were members of a church or synagogue in 1988. Id.
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West-as if someone had lost a gunfight and was about to be buried and
the townspeople sent for the parson. There are occasions, especially
when someone is being buried, when it is comforting to have a parson say
a few religious words in public.
The other source of patronage for religious legal ethics is the old
mansion down the street-academic religion. That mansion houses a
busy, healthy enterprise. It has large ground-floor rooms for profession-
als in publishing, religious education, the clergy, and those who educate
such people in university professional schools. It has even larger and
grander rooms for the thousands of professors who teach undergraduate,
graduate, and professional courses in theology, ethics, religion, Jewish
law, social science, and the humanities. Law teachers seem not to know
it, but there are many more full-time scholars in higher education who
devote their attention to religion than there are who devote their atten-
tion to the law. The mansion of religious ethics does not begin to hold
them all, but it is a big house and it is full.
The mansion of academic religion has second-floor rooms for repre-
sentatives of denominational religion who maintain and regulate semi-
naries and divinity schools where religious ethics is taught and
pondered. Of course, it also has professional associations and certifica-
tion processes that are analogous to those tended in the legal-ethics
mansion. One of the first things any mansion devoted to either religion
or the law must do is to decide whom it is going to keep out.
The keepers of the mansion of academic religion do not keep out at-
torneys, but they do not pay much attention to them either. Those who
earn their bread with religious ethics seem to admit that law might have
something to do with religious ethics, and vice versa, but they prefer en-
tertaining such a possibility outside the mansion. I find that many peo-
ple in that mansion are very generous in helping me learn from them.
However, they distrust the law itself somewhat, and distrust those who
practice and teach law even more. When the keepers of the mansion
take up a legal-ethics question among themselves, as they occasionally
do, they are usually cynical about whether being righteous, in a religious
sense, 2 has anything to do with being an attorney.
It may be fair to say that people in the mansion of academic religion
are not very interested in the law. However, I suspect they are afraid of
the law, rather than disinterested in it. Perhaps they are afraid that the
worlds of power in which lawyers work will not be interested in them.
William H. Willimon, a teacher of ministers, indicates this fear when he
says, "Today's church resembles nothing so much as a poor palsied nurse
11 See Lisa Green Markoff, Hispanic Hit List, THE NATL L.J., Nov. 6, 1989, at 4.
12 See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1956 (1986). In this essay,
"righteous" refers to "[c]onforming to the standard of the divine." Id.
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beside the culture's deathbed, mumbling words of comfort as the society
disintegrates." 3 One would think that those who claim access to the
Ruler of the Universe would not despair so much about appellate judges
and fourteen-inch paper. But they do.
The literal insignificance of the sub-discipline that I am calling reli-
gious legal ethics gives no hint of how vast and how potent its patrons
are. That is odd, and is worth thinking about, because it means that
something is wrong with the patrons. Religious legal ethics being sup-
ported by lawyer-patrons and academic-patrons is like biblical Israel be-
ing protected from Assyria by the Egyptians and from Egypt by the As-
syrians. It can also be compared to the situtation of the Lutheran
missionary described by Garrison Keillor who was sent alone to convert
Vienna to the Christian faith. The Catholics of Vienna fed him well, but
he did not get much encouragement from them. The American Luther-
ans sent him his tiny missionary paycheck, but little other help.
In any case, I am one of those who uses the attic room with the can-
dle and the bouquet of flowers. I tend, along with a few others, to con-
template moral propositions and quandaries involving lawyers from that
little room. For those who adhere seriously to their religious heritage,
who include most of the attorneys in America, I suggest that the best way
to be a lawyer and righteous at the same time is to practice law as a
ministry-a religious ministry-what we old-fashioned Roman Catholics
call an apostolate'4 and what Deitrich Bonhoeffer called radical disciple-
ship."s I want to suggest that a believer's work in the law is following
the Lord, being a proclaimer of the Kingdom of God, and, therefore, a
minister in the Kingdom.
I do not know enough to be useful to you about being a good person
and a lawyer from any other perspective. I have thought about other
perspectives, including most of those pursued by my housemates in the
mansion of legal ethics, and I find them useless. Some are incoherent.
Others are unpersuasive. Some are both.16 I find some of these perspec-
13 WILLIAM H. WILLIMON, PECULIAR SPEECH: PREACHING TO THE BAPTIZED 99 (1992).
14 See LEO RICHARD WARD, THE AMERICAN APOSTOLATE (1952).
15 See E. Clinton Gardner, Eschatological Ethics in JAMES F. CHILDRESS & JOHN MACQUAR-
RIE, THE WESTMINSTER DICTIONARY OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS 201-04 (1986); Edward Leroy
Long, Jr., Modern Protestant Ethics, CHILDRESS & MACQUARRIE, supra, at 383-88. Cf
VERNARD ELLER, IERKEGAARD AND RADICAL DISCIPLESHIP: A NEW PERSPECTIVE (1968).
16 [An important characteristic of the twentieth century is that there is no generally
agreed upon ultimate principle, body of knowledge, or power... to which all of us
ought appeal in settling disputes among competing goods to determine which is cor-
rect .... [Olur only recourse . . . is to appeal to procedural justice to decide whether
our view... is too narrow or the proposed good is unjust. The flourishing of compet-
ing goods refereed by procedural justice is an instance of an open, pluralistic society.
Tom Buford, THE CRESSET (Valparaiso University), June 1992, at 10 (teacher of religious
ethics at Furnam University).
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tives interesting, in the same way that I find major league baseball inter-
esting. But I have not found any other perspective in the other rooms of
the mansion that helps me complete my mission-to talk and write
about being righteous while being an attorney. I accomplish this in the
same way I learned about existing in the world when I grew up in the
First Baptist Church in my hometown, Fruita, Colorado. Although I
know much more now than I did then, I do not know anything better.
Therefore, those of us who use the little room in the attic address the
practice of law as ministry.
My purpose here is to claim legitimacy for religious legal ethics by
arguing that most American attorneys should ignore most of what my
colleagues in the mansion say about legal ethics, and should regard offi-
cial "ethics" rules for attorneys the way they regard the motor vehicle
code-as an administrative regulation having very little to do with being
righteous and an attorney simultaneously. This entails, as I have tried
to demonstrate elsewhere,' 7 turning to fellow believers in church, tem-
ple, and synagogue for moral guidance, and turning to the Bible and our
traditions for the professional moral heritage of Jews and Christians.
* * *
A troublesome question arises when viewing the practice of law as
ministry, and I want to discuss it. Some of my friends in religious legal
ethics ask: Would it not be better to be as pluralistic as you can, even
when you are in the little room?i" Would it not be better to appeal to the
ethical sensibilities of as many listeners as you possibly can? And to
avoid the "sectarian" content of what you say as often as you can? Some
of my friends in legal ethics ask me why I refer to being a Christian and
a lawyer, rather than being a good person and a lawyer, when I address
religious legal ethics.' 9 Some believe this approach draws unnecessary
lines.
17 See The Church and the Law in FESTSCHRIFT IN MEMORY OF WILLIAM STRINGFELLOW
(Andrew W. McThenia, Jr., ed., forthcoming); Thomas L. Shaffer, Erastian and Sectarian
Arguments in Religiously Affiliated American Law Schools, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1859 (1993);
SHAFFER & SHAFFER, supra note 1, ch. 8; Thomas L. Shaffer, The Tension Between Law in
America and the Religious Tradition in LAW AND THE ORDERING OF OUR LIFE TOGETHER 28-
53 (Richard John Neuhaus ed., 1989). See also Robert E. Rodes, Jr. & Thomas L. Shaffer, A
Christian Theology for Roman Catholic Law Schools, 14 U. DAYTON L. REV. 5 (1988).
18 Philip Gleason, Speaking of Diversity: Language and Ethnicity in Twentieth-Century
America 256-57 (1992). The author suggests another way to look at this-that pluralism in
American ideology is a religion of its own. Id. That would indicate more serious grounds
for resistance than those I suggest here. See THOMAS L. SHAFFER, FAITH AND THE PROFES-
SIONS, ch. 6 (1987).
19 See THOMAS L. SHAFFER, ON BEING A CHRISTIAN AND A LAWYER (1981) (the author's first
book on legal ethics). I later regretted not having taken more careful account-certainly in
the title, as well as in much of the text-of Jews. Yet, to also include Jews is not the same
397
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I guess the most honest response, as I hope always to be open, has to
do with what has happened to the Church in America.20 It is like Prohi-
bition: Even if I were passionate on the evils of rum, which I am not, I
would not favor the re-institution of Prohibition because I have learned
from the past.
Most of the ethical energy of American Christians has been spent on
trying to make America work-on making a religion out of liberal democ-
racy and a liturgy out of American political and legal processes. I find
that this has not worked out very well. I doubt, then, that we can talk
together about being a good person and a lawyer as something specifi-
cally American. After centuries of effort by Christians to have America
itself be a communal instrument of moral reasoning, we are further from
coherence than ever. Americans do not have a common idea of what a
good person is. Our common ethic is not an ethic at all; it is the insertion
of a referee in a game in which the only rule is that every person is his
own tyrant. My neighbors in the mansion of legal ethics often talk about
"values." This is similar to the time Charles Van Doren wrote something
about "values" and showed it to his brother Mark, who said, "Don't say
'values.' Say what you mean."21
As an American and a Christian, I have only one idea in which I am
confident, and that is the one I smuggle in and out of that little room in
the mansion. It is a religious idea, which entails following the Lord who
says to the nation of priests, "Be holy as I am holy."22
Most of the discussion I hear concerning legal ethics-which has, in
the last two decades, built this mansion and established an elaborate
and complex discipline to pursue in the mansion-is that a good person
is one who is free to choose whatever he or she wants. If there are moral
restraints on the choices people make, and the restraints are beneficial,
they seem to be systemic restraints that are necessary to processes that
protect each person's freedom of choice. To be good in this sense is to
serve these processes, as both citizens and as attorneys.
The old civil-religious notion that America was God's New Israel, a
city on a hill or a righteous empire, seemed to give our civic and political
culture a direction. I do not think it actually gave a direction, or at least
not a direction that was not evil; but it seemed to. In any case, goodness
as choice does not give us somewhere to go; in fact, suggesting any goal
or any notion of common good in our society is condemned as a limitation
as talking about "good persons" generally; my conclusion, at least in ethics, is that Jews
and Christians share a communal, commissioned, and infallible tradition.
20 1 think it has also happened to much of Judaism in America, but since I am not Jewish,
it is surely best to let Jewish people speak for themselves on this point.
21 MARK VAN DOREN, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MARK VAN DOREN (Greenwood Press 1968)
(1958).
22 Leviticus 11:45.
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on freedom of choice. So I am not able to arrive at a pluralistic answer to
the question of whether a good person can be a lawyer because, to com-
plete the circle, I am not allowed to think that a good person is one who
has a goal or purpose in life which he can insist be respected for what it
is, rather than just because he chose it.
The immediate answer to this difficulty, which admittedly worries
me, is that I return to my little room in the attic because none of the
other rooms make as much sense as my room does. From there, I bring
what I bring to the sub-discipline of legal ethics as I find it. I think the
most truthful approach is to leave the labels in place.
Of course I have evangelical reasons for doing that. Law as ministry
is law as a way to follow a Lord who claims to be, Who-I must tell you-
is the Ruler of the Universe. That is a political and legal claim. It would
be best for you to recognize the claim, if you have not already done so. If
you have already recognized the claim-as most of you have-I want you
to ponder the significance of such a claim for legal ethics.
I had a student in a large professional responsibility section at
Washington and Lee University who stopped me in the hall after class
one day and said, "Hey, you're trying to influence these people, aren't
you?" Well, sure ....

